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One basic premise found in all recent decisions adopt-
ing an implied warranty of habitability is the contention
that the doctrine of caveat emptor cannot stand, even
on its own terms, in today's leasing transactions. The
theoretical meaning of a lease has no relevancy in the
modern leasing situation and should be replaced with
realistic concepts. Indeed, the rights of tenants have
been broadened, the courts are now viewing leases in
the light of caveat venditor.
The author is a practicing attorney in Maryland and
Washington D.C., with the firm of Blatt Rosenberg-Blatt.
He received his B.A. from the State University of New
York in 1966, he J.D. from University of Baltimore in
1969, and undertook post-graduate studies at George
Washington University.
Note: On the weekend of March 15, 1981, a represent
ative group of women employees of the United Nations
in New York, dressed in black, appeared to present their
complaint that about 80% of them had been harassed
with demands for sexual favors in return for promotion
or continued employment. Kurt Waldheim's response
was that he would have preferred to have seen them
dressed in pink.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
MARYLAND RULE 782 (c) may not be used
by prosecution as a plea bargain substi-
tute - State v. Limbo, An Imaginary
Opinion by the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land
By Harold D. Norton
Opinion by Forthright, J.
We granted certiorari in this case to examine a long
standing procedure which, while serving a legitimate role
in the criminal justice system in some instances, may
lack sufficient procedural safeguards to prevent its use as
a tool of prosecutorial oppression. The issue, whether
Maryland Rule 782(c) might allow the state to place a
charge on stet' in return for a defendant's cooperation
in an investigation, and later reinstitute the charge re-
gardless of the defendant's subsequent conduct, has not
yet been addressed by this court.
In MD.R.P. 782(c) Disposition by stet is explained.
"Upon motion by the State's Attorney, the court may
postpone trial indefinitely upon a charging document by
marking the case 'stet' on the docket."
When a case is stetted, all further action is held in
abeyance. Outstanding warrants which would lead to ar-
rest or detention of the defendant are recalled or re-
voked. MD.R.P. (d). At the request of either party a stet-
ted case may be rescheduled for trial within one year of
the stet and thereafter only by court order for good
cause shown. MD.R.P. 782(c).
The state candidly admits the facts as stated by peti-
tioner, Limbo. Limbo was indicted for receiving stolen
goods2 on July 2, 1978. The prosecuting attorney pro-
posed, through defense counsel, that Limbo cooperate
with the police by "identifying certain members" of a
fencing operation. In return for this cooperation, the
prosecutor promised to place the theft indictment on stet
docket. The stet was entered in open court on October
3, 1978. The defendant was not advised that he had
waived his right to a speedy trial (in the event the
charges were rescheduled) by accepting the stet. See
Fowler v. State, 18 Md. App. 37, 350 A.2d 20 (1973).
Judicial inquiry into the reason a case is being placed on
stet docket is not required by MD.R.P. 782(c) and none
was made.
The defendant was not present at the hearing. Nor
was he required to be by Rule 782(c). The rule requires
only that notice be sent to the defendant and his counsel
of record.
Within the next nine months, the police had success-
fully infiltrated the fencing operation. The state main-
tained that their success was due to independent investi-
gation although Limbo had given the police "a few
names". On October 2, 1979, the stetted charge against
Limbo was rescheduled. Limbo was subsequently found
guilty and sentenced to ten years imprisonment pursu-
ant to MD. ANN. CODE art. 27 §466.
At trial the state explained that the charge was stetted
on the docket because information was to be supplied
by Limbo and the prosecution needed the threat of rein-
stitution of the charge as an incentive. Had the state
nolle prosequied the charge instead, the indictment
would have been cancelled. Brady v. State, 26 Md.
App. 283, 374 A.2d 613 (1977). In MD.R.P. 782(a) a
State's Attorney may terminate a prosecution on a
charging document and dismiss the charge at his discre-
tion, by entering a nolle prosequi on the record in open
court, with a statement of the reasons. The defendant
need not be present. Notice will be sent to defendant
and his counsel.
When nolle prosequi has been entered all pretrial re-
lease conditions are terminated and bail posted by the
defendant on those charges shall be released. MD.R.P.
782(b).
The state contended that Limbo could not complain
because he voluntarily accepted the risk that the state
might reschedule the charge at its discretion within one
year. While we realize that Rule 782(c), in its present
form, allows the state to reschedule a stetted charge
within one year, we are convinced that this procedure
violates the requirement of fundamental fairness assured
by the Maryland Constitution, Article XXIII, and The
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution.
A plea bargain was not used under Rule 733 because
the state wished "to keep [its] options open."
Traditionally a "plea bargain" requires a plea of guilty
or nolo contendre to one or more charges upon the
condition that the state make some concession in regard
to those or other pending charges. Gray v. State, 38
Md. App. 343, 380 A.2d 1071 (1974). When a prosecu-
tor makes a promise that serves as consideration or in-
ducement for a plea, that promise must be fulfilled and
may be specifically enforced by the defendant. Kisamore
v. State, 286 Md. 654, 409 A.2d 719 (1980). The
standard to be applied is one of fair play and equity un-
der the facts and circumstances of the case, and where
an agreement has been reached, it would be a grave er-
ror to permit the prosecution to repudiate its promises
where the defendant is willing to perform, but because
of some action taken by the prosecution, is unable.
State v. Brockman, 277 Md. 687, 698-99, 357 A.2d
376, 383-84 (1976); see generally 9 U. Bait. L. Rev.
295 (1980), on plea bargain. We see no constitutional
significance between a traditional plea bargain and the
case at hand.
The stet procedure may be used as an inducement for
investigatory cooperation. A prosecutor may promise
not to reschedule a stetted case so long as the defendant
cooperates with the authorities. The defendant's fear
that a charge may be rescheduled acts to insure his co-
operation. In light of the standards imposed by other ex-
isting procedures and the need for the state to appear
open and fair in its dealings with defendants, we believe
that Rule 782 (c) cannot stand in its present form.
We first note that Rule 733 provides a detailed proce-
dure that must accompany a plea agreement involving a
plea of guilty or nolo contendre. The judge must be ad-
vised of the terms of the agreement, which he may ac-
cept or reject, and, most importantly, all proceedings
pursuant to the agreement must be stated on the record.
MD.R.P. 733(c). Therefore, when a question arises con-
cerning the obligations of either party, MD.R.P. 733(d)
acts as a plea bargain "Statute of Frauds", with the
agreement reduced to a writing.
No similar safeguards exist under MD.R.P. 782(c). En-
try of stet requires a pro forma motion by the state; the
trial judge need not be made aware of any underlying
agreement; the state may unilaterally reschedule the
charge for trial at any time within one year without ex-
planation; only after a year is "good cause" required to
reschedule. Rule 782(c) seems to provide a presumption
that neither party is prejudiced by rescheduling a stetted
charge within one year. We see in this case, however,
that circumstances other than passage of time may prej-
udice a criminal defendant to the extent that it would be
unfair to reinstitute the charge, e.g., production of self-
incriminating evidence or witnesses. In addition, the in-
FORUM
tegrity of the judiciary is injured whenever the state is
seen as promising that which it need not deliver.
Because of these shortcomings, MD.R.P. 782 would
be amended by this court to provide the following safe-
guards when a charge is placed on stet docket with
defendant's consent: first, that the defendant be present;
second, that the trial judge be fully advised of the rea-
sons for the entry of the stet; third, that the trial judge
consent; fourth, that the defendant be told that by ac-
cepting the stet, he waives his right to a speedy trial;
fifth, that the proceeding fully appear on the record to
the same extent as MD.R.P. 733; and last, that the state
be required to show "good cause" whenever a stetted
charge is sought to be rescheduled.
CONVICTION VACATED: CASE REMANDED FOR
HEARING IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS OPINION
Concurring opinion by Dictum, J.
I can foresee no situation which would require the use
of a stet, instead of other existing procedures. In my
opinion, the stet procedure is too unpredictable and in-
definite to be used in criminal prosecutions where less
suspect means are available to achieve similar ends.
For example, where a busy prosecutor has a defend-
ant before a court and is unable, for one reason or an-
other, to proceed, he may ask that the case be stetted.
At first this seems perfectly reasonable since the defend-
ant may still request that the case be tried. Where the
defendant is present, stet may not be entered, under
Rule 782(c), without his consent. As a practical matter,
the state would then be forced to either nolle prosequi
the charge or ask for postponement. Where postpone-
ment is proper, the state Would be forced to prepare its
case. Where postponement would not be allowed, a
nolle prosequi would provide a final determination of
the charge. In both instances, the merits of the charge
are more strictly scrutinized, and a final determination
assured. If a charge cannot be proven, society's interests
are vindicated through the nolle prosequi. If a charge
can be proven, but at a later time, society's interested
are vindicated by a trial on the merits. Remove the op-
tion of stetting the case and something more is pre-
cluded: the possibility that a guilty person may never be
tried or that an innocent person be subject to "the cloud
of an unliquilated criminal charge" for one year's time.
Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S 213, 226-227
(1966) (concurring opinion). The solution to a large
number of valid charges being entered nolle prosequi is
not to allow the prosecutor to act as a judge and set the
case on the back burner, but to put a greater emphasis
on being ready with the case the first time. For these
reasons, I have no reservation in striking down Rule
782, in its present form, as an anachronism which has
outlived its usefulness.
' See MD.R.P. 782 (1980).
2 MD. ANN. CODE art. 27 §466 (1976 Repl. Vol. & Supp. 1978), re-
codified as MD. ANN. CODE art. 27 §342 (1976 Repl. Vol. & Supp.
1980).
